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AbstrAct: Preventive arrest is a controversial instrument of crime 
prevention that is commonly regulated in police law and in some criminal 
procedures. Its conformity with Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) has been the subject of many decisions and 
judgments of the European Court on Human Rights. Since its judgment 
in the Ciulla case in 1989, the Court has been of the opinion that § 1 
(b) of Article 5 is applicable to preventive deprivation of liberty, which 
requires that detention be applied to secure the fulfilment of any 
obligation prescribed by law, if the obligation is specific enough. On the 
contrary, in the Court’s opinion, § 1 (c) of Article 5 is inapplicable outside 
the framework of criminal procedure. In the judgment of 22 October 
2018 in the case of S., V., and A. v. Denmark, the Grand Chamber took 
the opposite view, which calls for an analysis of how far preventive 
arrest is allowed under the ECHR. The analysis and European standards 
may also be of interest to researchers from non-European countries, as 
the problem of the use of preventive arrests is discussed worldwide.
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resumo: A prisão preventiva é um instrumento controverso de prevenção 
à criminalidade, regulada normalmente no direito policial e em alguns 
sistemas processuais penais. Em conformidade com o artigo 5 da CEDH, 
tal tema foi objeto de diversas decisões de debates no TEDH. Desde o caso 
Ciulla em 1989, o Tribunal adotou a posição de que o § 1 (b) do artigo 5 é 
aplicável na segregação preventiva da liberdade, requerendo que a prisão 
seja decretada em atenção aos requisitos determinados na legislação, se 
eles forem suficientemente específicos. Por outro lado, na visão do TEDH, 
o § 1 (b) do artigo 5 é inaplicável a ramos distintos do direito processual 
penal. Contudo, no julgamento de 22 de outubro de 2018, no caso S., V. 
e A. v. Dinamarca, o Tribunal Pleno adotou posição oposta, o que impõe a 
análise dos limites de aplicação da prisão preventiva.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: prisão preventiva; processo penal; direito à liberdade; 
prevenção; Convenção Europeia de Direitos Humanos.
1. IntroductIon
The right to personal liberty is without a doubt one of the core 
human rights guaranteed by national constitutions and international 
instruments. Therefore, every legislative attempt to create legal grounds 
for limiting the right must be given due attention, and any regulation must 
comply with the requirements of Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)2. This is also very important in the case of 
deprivation of liberty for preventive purposes. More or less distant 
history shows that preventive detention could be used for political 
reasons, persecution of certain members or groups of society, or their 
discrimination3. There is also a danger that the personal freedom of 
2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 4 November 1950. Hereafter referred to 
as “the Convention” or “ECHR”.
3 See for example STASCHEIT, Ulrich; HART, Dieter, Vorbeugehaft für 
Demonstranten?, Kritische Justiz, v. 2, n. 1, 1969, p. 88-92 on the use of pre-
ventive detention as an instrument of repression in Nazi Germany. In Poland, 
after introduction of martial law by the communist regime, several thousands 
of opposition activists were interned on the base of decree of 12 December 
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individuals, perceived rightly or not as posing a risk, could be easily 
sacrificed for the sake of the security of society.
The issue of the preventive deprivation of liberty has long been 
discussed in different contexts (pretrial-detention, post-conviction 
detention of sexual offenders, internment of persons suspected of 
terrorism, detention of persons with mental disorders, etc.)4. One aspect 
is its application in cases when there is an imminent and concrete risk 
of commission of a crime. In a line of cases, which will be presented 
below, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)5 for many years 
distinguished situations where a person is already a suspect from those 
where there are no grounds to suspect a person of any previous crime. 
This approach was changed by the judgment of the Grand Chamber 
in the case S., V., and A. v. Denmark of 22 October 20186, where the 
Court expressed the opinion that preventive arrest may be based on 
Article 5 § 1 (c) of the ECHR, irrespective of whether the person is 
suspected of having committed a crime. This paper will explore the 
consequences of the ECtHR’s judgment for crime prevention policies 
and the legal regulations of the parties to the Convention, discussing 
the need and possibilities to change the existing regulations relating to 
1981. See INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL REMEMBRANCE, The IPN on the 
25th anniversary of introducing of the Martial Law in Poland, https://ipn.
gov.pl/en/news/221,The-IPN-on-the-25th-anniversary-of-introducing-of-
the-Martial-Law-in-Poland.html.
4 See for example ANGEL Arthur R. et al., Preventive Detention: An Empirical 
Analysis, Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, v. 6, n. 2, 1971, p. 
300; CORRADO Michael L., Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The 
Problem of Preventive Detention, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 
86, n. 3, 1996, p. 778; MONTAGUE Phillip, Justifying Preventive Detention, 
Law and Philosophy, v. 18, n. 2, 1999, p. 173; COLE David, Out of the Shadows: 
Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists and War, California Law Review, 
v. 97, 2009, p. 693; ASHWORTH Andrew, ZEDNER Lucia, Preventive justice, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; KEYZER Patrick (ed.), Preventive De-
tention: Asking the Fundamental Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013; LUDSIN Hallie, Preventive Detention and the Democratic State, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
5 Hereafter referred to as “ECtHR” or “the Court”.
6 Judgment of the ECtHR in case S., V., and A. v Denmark of 22 October 2018, 
applications n. 35553/12, 36678/12 and 36711/12.
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arrest. The European standards may also be of interest to researchers 
from other legal systems, as the issue of preventive detention is debated 
in many states.
2. Arrest for preventIve purposes In crImInAl procedure And 
polIce lAw
First, it is necessary to define the term “arrest”, as there are 
differences in perception of the term. In this paper, the term “arrest” 
is understood as a short-term deprivation of liberty, usually not 
exceeding a few days, effected by police forces for reasons other than 
penalty retribution7. Such arrest may be transformed later into pre-
trial detention, which may last for a longer period if there is sufficient 
evidence to charge the person and if bail or other measures (police 
supervision, electronic monitoring, or house arrest) are not adequate. 
Arrest is usually made in individual cases, which distinguishes it from 
general internment.
Preventive purpose in the context of arrest generally mean 
excluding or at least lowering the risk of commission of crime in the 
future. Therefore, the purpose of preventive arrest is protection of 
society or certain persons (especially victims) against the acts of the 
persons arrested. However, in some countries, there is also a legal base 
for deprivation of liberty to protect a suspect against harm from society, 
certain persons, or even himself or herself8, which is recognised as 
compatible with the ECHR9. Despite some similarities between the former 
7 In some legal systems (for example in Poland), the term arrest is used also 
in relation to penalty. This kind of arrest has, however, completely different 
character (reaction – mainly retributive - on a criminal act done in the past).
8 See sections 38(1)(a)(vi) and (b)(ii) of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 in England and Wales, available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1984/60/contents and article 144 (2) of the French Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Code de procédure pénale) 1957. Available at https://www.legis-
lationline.org/download/id/8539/file/France_CPC_am022020_fr.pdf.
9 See judgment of the ECtHR of 23 September 1998 in case I. A. v France, 
1/1998/904/1116 and the English case Archer v The Commissioner of Police 
of the Metropolis, [2020] EWHC 1567 (QB).
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and the latter purposes of arrest, I opt for calling the latter as “protective”, 
not “preventive” arrest, as they have different purposes.
As mentioned, arrests for preventive purposes may be applied in 
different legal frameworks. The main frameworks are criminal procedures 
and police law. To illustrate this difference, examples of Danish and Polish 
regulations will be used.
The first framework is criminal procedure. Preventive arrest may 
take place when, during the proceedings, it is established that the person 
suspected of committing a crime may commit another crime in the future. 
According to article 755 (1) of the Danish Administration of Justice 
Act (Retsplejeloven) 1916 (which is the Danish code of criminal and 
civil procedure)10: “The police may arrest any person who is reasonably 
suspected of a criminal offence subject to public prosecution, if arrest 
is deemed necessary to prevent further criminal offences, to secure the 
person’s presence for the time being, or to prevent his association with 
others”. In Poland, Article 244 § 1a of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Kodeks postępowania karnego) 199711 provides that “A person may 
be arrested by the Police if there are justified grounds to suspect that 
this person committed an offence with the use of violence against a 
member of his household and it is feared that such an offence may be 
repeated, especially if the suspected person is threatening to do so” and 
Article 244 § 1b of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1997 makes such 
arrest mandatory “if the offence referred to in § 1a was committed with 
the use of a firearm, a knife, or any other dangerous item and there 
is a fear that an offence with the use of violence against a member of 
the suspected person’s household may be repeated, especially if the 
suspected person is threatening to do so”. As might be observed, in 
Polish criminal procedures, preventive arrest is possible only in cases of 
domestic violence, while in Denmark, there is no such limitation. This 
kind of arrest may be called criminal preventive arrest, as it is applied 
within criminal procedures in a criminal case.
10 Available at https://danskelove.dk/retsplejeloven.
11 Available at http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU1997089 
0555/U/D19970555Lj.pdf.
1602 | LACH, Arkadiusz.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 3, p. 1597-1630, set.-dez. 2021. 
The second framework is police (administrative) law. 
Regulations concerning police activities oriented at preserving public 
order and the prevention of crime allow for short deprivation of liberty 
if a certain behaviour of person indicates that it is likely that the person 
may commit a crime because, for example, the person intends to 
take part in riots or brawling between football hooligans, which is 
foreseeable from his or her behaviour and from objects found in the 
possession of the person. As this kind of deprivation of liberty is not 
connected with criminal procedure, it may be described as a non-
criminal preventive arrest. Examples of this may be found in both 
countries mentioned above.
In Denmark, § 5 (3) of the Danish Law on Police Activities (Lov 
om politiets virksomhed) 201512 provides that where the less intrusive 
measures set out in subsection 2 are found to be inadequate to avert a 
danger, the police may, if necessary, detain the person or persons causing 
the danger. Such detention must be as short and moderate as possible and 
should not extend beyond 6 hours where possible. In the case of danger 
related to riots, the detention should not extend beyond 12 hours where 
possible (§ 9 (3) of the Danish Law on Police Activities).
In Poland, non-criminal preventive arrest is regulated generally 
in Article 15 (3) of the Police Act (Ustawa o Policji) 199013, according 
to which the police have the power to arrest persons, obviously causing 
imminent danger to life or health and to property. Separate grounds 
of arrest are provided for persons using violence in family if they 
cause direct danger to human life or health (Article 15a (1) of the 
Police Act 1990).
The comparison between criminal and non-criminal preventive 
arrest leads to the observation that in the first case, it is necessary to have 
a reasonable suspicion that a crime has already been committed (which 
usually warrants the possibility of initiating criminal proceedings) and 
that there is a threat of another criminal act, while in the case of police 
law, there is no reasonable suspicion of past offence required, only the 
threat of future offence. In other words, in the first case, investigation 
12 Available at https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2019/1270.
13 Available at http://www.policja.pl/ftp/pliki/police_act.pdf.
1603
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 3, p. 1597-1630, set.-dez. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i3.609 |
takes place (on the base of criminal procedure law), and in the second 
case, non-criminal police operations/activities (on the base of police 
law). The distinction between criminal procedure and police law is 
very important because there might be different competent authorities, 
guarantees, periods of detention, etc. It is also possible that preventive 
arrest is regulated only as a non-criminal measure by police law. In 
some countries, the distinction between preventive arrest in criminal 
procedure and police law is not so sharp. This is particularly visible in 
the case of common law countries, where the police act on the basis of 
police law during investigations of past criminal acts or purely preventive 
operations/activities14. For example, section 24 of the English Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 regulates both situations: (1) A constable 
may arrest without a warrant—(a) anyone who is about to commit an 
offence; (b) anyone who is in the act of committing an offence; (c) 
anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to 
commit an offence; (d) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting to be committing an offence. (2) If a constable has reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may 
arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to 
suspect of being guilty of. 
The aim of non-criminal preventive arrest is the interruption 
of antisocial activity before it fulfils elements of crime rather than the 
initiation of criminal proceedings. 
The above presents a wide possibility of the use of preventive 
arrest on the basis of domestic law in many European states and raises a 
question as to which forms of preventive detention are presently allowed 
under the ECHR.
14 Therefore, it is very difficult for a common law lawyer to understand the civil 
law concept of criminal procedure and police law. For more on the issue in 
the context of German regulations, see ENGELHART, Marc, Countering Ter-
rorism at the Limits of Criminal Liability in Germany in: DYSON Matthew, 
VOGEL Benjamin (eds.), The Limits of Criminal Law. Anglo-German Concepts 
and Principles. Cambridge-Antwerp-Chicago, Intersentia, 2018, p. 457–461.
1604 | LACH, Arkadiusz.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 3, p. 1597-1630, set.-dez. 2021. 
3. posItIon of the ecthr In ostendorf v. GermAny And 
eArlIer cAses
In some cases, the ECtHR analysed the problem of preventive 
arrest. The first important issue was which ground listed in Article 5 
(1) is applicable. For decades, the Court took the view that point c is 
inapplicable to pure preventive detention15. Recapitulation of the position 
may be found in the case of Ostendorf v. Germany16. In that case, before 
a match, a group of football fans from Bremen, known to the police as 
troublemakers, was told by the police in Frankfurt am Main not to leave 
the police escort and not to try to engage in any confrontation with the 
football fans of the opposite side. The applicant ignored that and left 
the escort. Besides, when the mobile found in his possession rang in the 
presence of the police officers, it displayed the name of a person from 
Frankfurt am Main. This the police interpreted as setting up a brawl. 
Ostendorf was arrested at 2:30 pm and detained at the police station until 
6:30 pm to prevent him from committing an offence. It was not contested 
in the case that, although it was only for a short time, he was deprived of 
his liberty. The question was, therefore, whether any ground in Article 
5 (1) was applicable to justify the detention.
By first examining Article 5 § 1 (c), the Court observed that the 
applicant had not yet committed a criminal offence, and therefore the first 
part of the paragraph was inapplicable. In the alternative in sub-paragraph 
c (“when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing 
an offence”), the Court expressed the opinion “that under paragraphs 1 
(c) and 3 of Article 5, detention to prevent a person from committing an 
offence must, in addition, be <<effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority>> and that that person is <<entitled 
to trial within a reasonable time>>. Under its long-established case-law, 
the second alternative of Article 5 § 1 (c) therefore only governs pre-trial 
detention and not custody for preventive purposes without the person 
15 See cases Ječius v Lithuania, judgment of the ECtHR of 31 July 2000, applica-
tion n. 34578/97 and Schwabe and M. G. v Germany, judgment of the ECtHR 
of 1 December 2011 r., applications n. 8080/08 and 8577/08.
16 Judgment of the ECtHR of 7 March 2013 in case Ostendorf v Germany, appli-
cation n. 15598/08.
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concerned being suspected of having already committed a criminal 
offence”17. In this case, the arrest was aimed at preventing crime and 
not at prosecuting the crime committed. Sub-paragraph c was therefore 
declared inapplicable. Regarding the suggestion of the German government 
to revise the case law concerning the issue, the Court answered that “that 
interpretation could neither be reconciled with the entire wording of sub-
paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 nor with the system of protection set up 
by Article 5 as a whole. (…) In particular, contrary to the Government’s 
submission, the term <<trial>> does not refer to a judicial decision on 
the lawfulness of the preventive police custody. Those proceedings 
are addressed in paragraph 4 of Article 5”18. Further, the Court did not 
agree with the argument of the German government, that accepting this 
interpretation means that the second alternative of Article 5 § 1 (c) can 
be considered as superfluous in addition to the first alternative of that 
provision because the second alternative may refer to cases of criminal 
preparation of an offence19. Referring to the subsequent argument, that 
interpretation of Article 5 must take into account the positive obligations 
of the states under Articles 2 and 3, the Court observed that “The State’s 
positive obligations under different Convention Articles do not, therefore, 
as such warrant a different or wider interpretation of the permissible 
grounds for a deprivation of liberty exhaustively listed in Article 5 § 1”20.
Rejecting the possibility of applying sub-paragraph c, the Court 
pointed out the second part of sub-paragraph b (“in order to secure the 
fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law”) as an adequate ground 
for preventive arrest. The Court observed that the “obligation here at 
issue, namely, to keep the peace by not committing a criminal offence 
can only be considered as <<specific and concrete>> for the purposes 
of that provision if the place and time of the imminent commission of 
the offence and its potential victim(s) have been sufficiently specified. 
The Court is satisfied that this was the case here. The applicant was to 
be prevented from arranging a brawl between Bremen and Frankfurt 
17 Ostendorf v Germany, § 82.
18 Ostendorf v Germany, § 85.
19 Ostendorf v Germany, § 86.
20 Ostendorf v Germany, § 87.
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am Main hooligans in the hours before, during or in the hours after the 
football match on 10 April 2004 in the city of Frankfurt or its vicinity 
and from committing offences including bodily assaults and breaches of 
the peace during such a brawl”21. The Court underlined that the applicant 
was ordered by the police to stay with the group, with a clear indication 
that any person leaving the group would be arrested22.
Moreover, in the Court’s opinion, by taking the preparatory acts, 
the applicant showed that he was going to disobey his obligation to keep 
the peace, and the arrest was not of a punitive nature, but intended only 
to ensure fulfilment of the obligation. The nature of the obligation, whose 
fulfilment was sought, was itself compatible with the Convention. It was 
also underlined that the arrest was lifted as soon as the obligation was 
“fulfilled” for the purposes of Article 5 (1) (b). Lastly, the Court noted 
that a due balance has been struck between the importance of securing 
the immediate fulfilment of the obligation in question in a democratic 
society and the importance of the right to liberty23.
Based on these arguments, the Court decided that the applicant’s 
arrest was justified under Article 5 § 1 (b).
A concurring opinion was given to the judgment by judges 
Lemmens and Jäderblom. Accepting the view of the majority that there 
was no breach of Article 5 in the case, they argued, however, that the 
proper ground of deprivation of liberty in the case was Article 5 § 1 
(c), because in fact the applicant was arrested to prevent commission 
of a crime or regulatory offence, not to enforce any police order, or for 
the mere fact of leaving the group being escorted to the stadium. The 
obligation not to commit criminal acts or regulatory offences was, in the 
opinion of the two judges, too general for the purpose of Article 5 § 1 (b) 
of the Convention. Indicating that Article 5 § 1 (c) was applicable, they 
expressed the view that “in situations where there is a vital public interest 
in preventing someone from committing an offence a limited possibility 
does exist for the law enforcing authorities to detain that person for a 
short period, even if he has not yet committed a crime and therefore 
21 Ostendorf v Germany, § 93.
22 Ostendorf v Germany, § 95.
23 Ostendorf v Germany, § 101 – 102.
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without the possibility that criminal proceedings will be opened against 
him”24. The authors of the concurring opinion referred to the early case 
of Lawless, pointing out that the subsequent judgments of the Court 
inappropriately restricted the purpose of bringing the detainee before a 
judge, as required in Article 5 § 3 to “deciding on the merits”, while the 
other possibility is examination of the question of deprivation of liberty.
4. posItIon of the ecthr In s., v., And A. v. denmArk
The view expressed in the Ostendorf case and other cases that 
were decided afterwards has been criticised. In the commentary on 
the judgment, it was pointed out that the view leads to arbitrariness, 
whereas the ratio legis of Article 5 (1) is to prevent arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty25. Further, in the judgment of 15 February 201726, the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom expressed the opinion that Article 5 § 1 
(b) was inapplicable to preventive arrest and followed the opinion of 
the minority in the Ostendorf judgment, declaring that 5 § 1 (c) was an 
adequate ground for detention. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, an 
obligation mentioned in Article 5 § 1 (b) must be more specific than a 
general obligation not to commit a crime, and from a practical point of 
view, there are sometimes situations when the police must act immediately 
without time to give a warning. Therefore the police who use preventive 
arrest must rely on Article 5 § 1 (c), and in the case of a short arrest, 
the police is not obliged to take the persons arrested before magistrates 
to be bound over to keep the peace, as this would be an unnecessary 
prolongation of their detention.
The criticism and the increasing role of preventive arrest in the 
legal systems of the parties to the Convention persuaded the Court to 
reconsider its position. The occasion for that was the case of S., V., and 
A. v. Denmark, which was referred for judgment to the Grand Chamber. 
24 Ostendorf v Germany, dissenting opinion, § 4.
25 Detention: football hooliganism – preventive detention – Ostendorf v Germa-
ny (15598/08), European Human Rights Law Review, v. 4, 2013, p. 428 – 432.
26 R (on the application of Hicks and others) v The Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis, [2017] UKSC 9.
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In this case, the applicants were Danish football hooligans who came 
to Copenhagen for a football match with Sweden. As the Danish police 
received intelligence that brawls between the hooligans from both sides 
were planned, they sent police officers to identify known troublemakers. 
The applicants were known to the police for being members of groups of 
hooligans, and there were also some signs that they were going towards a 
place where a fight between hooligans of both nationalities had already 
begun. Therefore, they were stopped by the police and kept in detention 
for 6–7 hours, until the last group of football fans was arrested for 
breaching public order. 
In its analysis, the Court pointed out that the case “reveals a need 
for the Court to revisit and further clarify its case-law, not only with a 
view to ensuring greater consistency and coherence but also in order 
to address more appropriately modern societal problems of the kind 
at issue in the case”27. It was underlined that many countries are facing 
problems with preventing offences and the breaching of public order 
during football matches and other mass events. It also quoted a passage 
from the Report of the Conference of Senior Officials on Human Rights 
to the Committee of Ministers, who, during discussions on the project of 
the Convention, expressed the opinion that “where authorised arrest or 
detention is effected on reasonable suspicion of preventing the commission 
of a crime, it should not lead to the introduction of a régime of a Police 
State. It may, however, be necessary in certain circumstances to arrest 
an individual to prevent his committing a crime, even if the facts which 
show his intention to commit the crime do not of themselves constitute 
a penal offence”28. 
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Grand Chamber adopted 
a different view from the view, which was expressed in earlier cases 
concerning sub-paragraphs b and c of Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR. From 
sub-paragraph b, the Court observed that “prior to their detention, the 
applicants were not given any specific orders, for example to remain with 
one group or another or to leave a specific place, and were not given a 
27 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 103.
28 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Preparatory Work on Article 5 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, DH 56 (10), Strasbourg, 8 August 1956, p. 19.
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clear warning of the consequences of their failure to comply with such 
an order. Nor were they told by the police which specific act they were to 
refrain from committing. It also does not appear that anyone in the group 
had been found in possession of instruments typically used in hooligan 
brawls”29. The mere existence of criminal law provisions forbidding 
breaching public order, damage to property, or causing injuries was 
regarded as insufficient. The Court recalled its position in Schwabe that 
the “duty not to commit a criminal offence in the imminent future cannot 
be considered sufficiently concrete and specific to fall under Article 5 § 
1 (b), at least as long as no specific measures have been ordered which 
have not been complied with”30. The Court also rejected the Danish 
government’s argument that a large police presence was sufficient to make 
the applicants aware that they should refrain from instigating hooligan 
fights at the place and time of the match, because the presence is usual 
during mass sport events and cannot be compared to the measures taken 
in Ostendorf. Such a wide interpretation of sub-paragraph (b) of Article 
5 § 1 would be incompatible with a notion of the rule of law. Therefore 
the circumstances of the case were different from those in Ostendorf, 
and the applicants’ detention was not covered by sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article 5 § 131.
Turning to sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, the Court pointed 
out that a strict interpretation of the term “offence” used in the provision 
constitutes an important safeguard against arbitrariness, because it does 
not permit a policy of general prevention directed against an individual 
or a category of individuals. Also in order to avoid arbitrariness, the 
sub-paragraph requires that the authorities must show in a convincing 
manner that “the person concerned would in all likelihood have been 
involved in the concrete and specific offence, had its commission not 
been prevented by the detention”32. This is similar to the requirement 
of showing reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence related 
to past offences.
29 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 84.
30 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 83.
31 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 85 – 87.
32 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 91.
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Then the Court observed that sub-paragraph c describes three 
types of situations when the lawful arrest or detention of a person is 
possible: “on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence”, 
“when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing 
an offence”, or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
fleeing after having committed an offence33. The Court referred to the 
travaux préparatoires of the Convention,34 which show that the second 
limb was intended as a separate ground for the deprivation of liberty. 
That interpretation was adopted by the Court in the Lawless case35 and 
some subsequent cases, including Matznetter v. Austria36 and Ireland 
v. the United Kingdom37. Surprisingly, the Court departed from that 
interpretation twenty-seven years later in the Ciulla case38 stating merely 
that “sub-paragraph (c) permits deprivation of liberty only in connection 
with criminal proceedings”. The Court did not explain the contradiction 
with Lawless in the Ciulla case or in any other subsequent decided case. 
After the analysis, “the Grand Chamber finds that it is necessary to clarify 
and adapt its case-law under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, and in 
particular to accept that the second limb of that provision can be seen 
as a distinct ground for deprivation of liberty, independently of the first 
limb. Although the “purpose” requirement under Article 5 § 1 (c) applies 
also to deprivation of liberty under the second limb of this provision, 
this requirement should be applied with a degree of flexibility so that the 
question of compliance depends on whether the detainee, as required by 
Article 5 § 3, is intended to be brought promptly before a judge to have 
the lawfulness of his or her detention reviewed, or to be released before 
such time. Furthermore, in the event of failure to comply with the latter 
33 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 98 – 99.
34 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Preparatory…, supra, p. 32.
35 Judgment of the ECtHR of 1 July 1961 in case Lawless v Ireland (n. 3), appli-
cation n. 332/57.
36 Judgment of the ECtHR of 10 November 1969 in case Matznetter v Austria, 
application n. 2178/64.
37 Judgment of the ECtHR of 13 December 1977 in case Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom, application n. 5310/71.
38 Judgment of ECtHR of 22 February 1989 in case Ciulla v Italy, application n. 
11152/84, § 38.
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requirement, the person concerned should have an enforceable right to 
compensation in accordance with Article 5 § 5. In other words, subject 
to the availability under national law of the safeguards enshrined in 
Article 5 §§ 3 and 5, the purpose requirement ought not to constitute an 
obstacle to short-term detention in circumstances such as those at issue 
in the present case”39. Having in mind the objections as to the relations 
between § 1 and § 3 of Article 5, the Court underlined that “when a person 
is released from preventive detention after a short period of time, either 
because the risk has passed or, for example, because a prescribed short 
time-limit has expired, the purpose requirement of bringing the detainee 
before the competent legal authority should not as such constitute an 
obstacle to short-term preventive detention falling under the second 
limb of Article 5 § 1 (c)”40.
The view expressed in the judgment of the Grand Chamber 
was followed in the subsequent case of Hannah Eiseman-Renyard and 
others v. the United Kingdom41. The case was taken to Strasbourg by the 
appellants in the case of Hicks and others mentioned above; it was decided 
by the UK Supreme Court and concerned with a deprivation of liberty 
to prevent a breach of the peace42. The ECtHR declared the applications 
inadmissible, founding that the offence of the breach of the peace is 
sufficiently concrete and specific in English law. In the circumstances 
of the case, “an objective observer would be satisfied that the applicants 
would in all likelihood have been involved in the concrete and specific 
offence had its commission not been prevented by their detention”; the 
applicants were released as soon as the imminent risk had passed and 
their deprivation of liberty was matter of hours only43.
39 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 137.
40 S., V., and A. v Denmark, § 126.
41 Decision of the ECtHR of 28 March 2019, application n. 57884/17.
42 According to common law „Every constable, and also every citizen, enjoys 
the power and is subject to a duty to seek to prevent, by arrest or other action 
short of arrest, any breach of the peace occurring in his presence, or any 
breach of the peace which (having occurred) is likely to be renewed, or any 
breach of the peace which is about to occur”. R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of 
Gloucester [2007] 2 AC 105.
43 Hannah Eiseman-Renyard and others v the United Kingdom, § 41 – 43.
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The judgment in S., V., and A. v. Denmark leads to the conclusion 
that the views that Article 5 § 1 (c) does not allow for any kind of pure 
preventive deprivation of liberty because it is not possible to detain 
somebody for a crime that has not yet been committed44 has become 
outdated. Further, it rightly precludes wide interpretation of Article 5 § 
1 (b). As the Court pointed out in Schwabe and M. G. v. Germany45, the 
latter provision “does not justify, for example, administrative internment 
meant to compel a citizen to discharge his general duty of obedience to 
the law”. The judgment has implications for both criminal procedure and 
police (administrative) law.
5. ImplIcAtIons for crImInAl procedure
The question arises whether today preventive arrest may be 
applied within criminal procedures in conformity with ECHR standards 
and whether there are reasons for such regulation in criminal procedures, 
not only in police law. In Ostendorf, the Court declared Article 5 § 
1 (c) inapplicable to short-term deprivation of liberty because of the 
view that it permitted deprivation of liberty only in connection with 
criminal proceedings and pre-trial detention. However, in many cases, 
the risk disappears after a few hours or is then so low that application 
for pre-trial detention would not be justified. The Court tried to solve 
the problem in Austin and others v. the United Kingdom46 by declaring 
that containing persons within a police cordon for a few hours to prevent 
injury or damage to property was not a deprivation of liberty; therefore, 
Article 5 was inapplicable. This reasoning is however vague47and risky. 
More convincing is the view adopted by the three dissenting judges that 
there was a deprivation of liberty in the case.
44 RAINEY Bernadette, WICKS Elizabeth, OVEY Clare, The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 245; HAR-
RIS David et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 319.
45 Schwabe and M. G. v Germany, § 73.
46 Judgment of the ECtHR of 15 March 2012 in case Austin and others v the Unit-
ed Kingdom, applications n 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09.
47 ASHWORTH Andrew, ZEDNER Lucia. Preventive…, supra, p. 59 – 64.
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The issue in S., V., and A. v. Denmark was whether sub-paragraph 
(c) of Article 5 § 1 is applicable to preventive detention aside from criminal 
proceedings. This was because of the particular circumstances of the case. 
This does not mean, however, that the judgment has no implications for 
the possibility of the use of preventive arrest within criminal procedure. 
Such a situation would be less problematic if the crime under investigation 
was criminal preparation or attempt, and arrest was applied to prevent 
completion of the elements of crime, as the jurisprudence of ECtHR 
directly indicated such a situation as an example of the application of 
Article 5 § 1 (c) of the ECHR48. In a situation in which the criminal 
act under investigation is different from the criminal act that is to be 
prevented, the answer is not easy. 
Criminal procedure is traditionally perceived as reactive, and 
targets crimes already committed49. Further, the use of coercive measures 
within criminal procedures focuses on its main aim: making a decision 
on the criminal responsibility of the accused. This is done mainly by 
securing his presence during the proceedings and avoiding interference 
with evidence. Therefore, the traditional grounds for the application of 
such coercive measures as arrest, pre-trial detention, police supervision, 
or house arrest are the risks of absconding or hiding, and the risk of 
tampering with evidence. Prevention of crime was traditionally regarded 
as something distant from criminal procedure, and a matter of police work 
and police law. Therefore, it is argued that the values of criminal procedure 
militate against using its regulations for purely preventive purposes50.
However, the perception of criminal procedures is changing51. 
Nowadays, many authors have pointed out its role in crime 
48 Ostendorf v Germany, § 86.
49 ASHWORTH Andrew, ZEDNER Lucia. Defending the Criminal Law: Reflec-
tions on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure and Sanctions, Criminal 
Law and Philosophy, v. 2, n. 2, 2008, p. 40.
50 DUFF Anthony et al. The Trial on Trial: Volume 3: Towards a Normative The-
ory of the Criminal Trial. London: Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 294.
51 VERVAELE John, A. E. Special Procedural Measures and Respect of Human 
Rights. General Report, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, v. 80, 2009, p. 91; 
KIRCHENGAST Tyrone. The Criminal Trial in Law and Discourse, Hound-
mills. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 220.
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prevention52. As J.A.E. Vervaele observes “The criminal justice system is 
increasingly used as an instrument to regulate the presence and the future 
and not to punish for behaviour in the past”53. Further, the concept of 
the positive obligation of the state to prevent crime requires an effective, 
complex framework of crime prevention, in which criminal procedure 
may be one of the instruments54. This has an impact on the regulations 
adopted in national legislations. In some criminal procedures, the risk 
that a suspected person may commit a crime is a ground for arrest, while 
in others, it is not. Regulation of the issue therefore depends on the legal 
system. The first European criminal procedure that introduced preventive 
grounds for arrest was probably the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure 
187355. According to § 175 (4) of the code, an investigating judge had the 
power to order the arrest of a person suspected of felony or misdemeanour 
if special circumstances justified the fear that the suspect might repeat 
a criminal act or complete a crime attempted or threatened. Similar 
regulations may be found in newer criminal procedures, for example, in 
the above-mentioned Danish and Polish provisions.
Nevertheless, in many criminal procedures, preventive grounds 
for arrest are not provided. For example, in Italy, the code of criminal 
procedure provides for arrest only related to a crime already committed56. 
52 HIRSCH BALLIN Marianne F. H. Anticipative Criminal Investigation. Theory 
and Counterterrorism Practice in the Netherlands and in the United States. 
The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2012, p. 584 – 585; PRADEL Jean, Procédure 
pénale, Paris: Cujas, 2015, p. 17.
53 VERVAELE John, A. E. Special…, supra, p. 91.
54 Judgment of the ECtHR of 28 October 1998 in case Osman v the United King-
dom, application n. 23452/94. See also LAWRYSEN Laurens, Human Rights 
in a Positive State. Rethinking the Relationship between Positive and Negative 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Cambridge–
Antwerp–Portland: Intersentia 2016, p. 51 and LAZARUS Liora. Positive Ob-
ligations and Criminal Justice: Duties to Protect and Care? in: ZEDNER Lucia, 
ROBERTS Julian V. (eds.). Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Crimi-
nal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, p. 147.
55 Strafprozeßordnung 1873. Available at http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fon-
tes/StPOOE1873.htm.
56 GALLI Francesca. The law on terrorism: The UK, France and Italy compared. 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2015, p. 145–146.
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In Poland, prevention may be invoked in the criminal procedure as a 
ground for pre-trial detention, but not for arrest by the police, except in 
the above-mentioned domestic violence cases.
On the basis of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the ECHR, regulating the issue of 
preventive deprivation of liberty in criminal procedure regarding another 
crime other than the subject matter of a prosecution was problematic under 
the Ostendorf standards, as this would require the judicial control and 
initiation of criminal proceedings, which in the case of the prevention of 
crime is usually not possible, because if a criminal act has been prevented, 
criminal prosecution is not possible. The new approach in S., V., and A. 
v. Denmark changes the situation, opening the possibility of using short-
time deprivation of liberty as a measure for preventing the continuation 
of criminal activity or commission of a new crime by a person who is 
already a suspect in criminal proceedings. In light of the judgment, it is 
also hard to share the opinion57 that the expression “when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence”, used in 
Article 5 § 1 (c) does not clearly refer to another offence other than the 
one under investigation.
In the case of criminal preventive arrest, the person arrested would 
be subjected to the regime of criminal procedure, not police law, which 
may be more protective (for example, better access to materials justifying 
preventive arrest and more stringent rules concerning admissibility of 
evidence). It also avoids mixing the two regimes: for example, criminal 
procedure for search of the person and police law for preventive arrest. It 
should also be observed that sometimes, according to criminal procedure, 
the authorities may arrest a person for strictly procedural reasons (for 
example, risk of flight or impossibility of establishing the identity of 
the person), and at the same time or later, the risk of committing a new 
crime is established. It would be easier to apply one set of rules for such 
a situation, instead of the application of parallel procedural and non-
procedural measures.
57 MERKEL Grischa. Detention before Trial and Civil Detention of Dangerous 
Individuals in: BROWN Darryl K., IONTCHEVA TURNER Jenia, WEISSER 
Bettina (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Process. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2019, p. 506.
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6. ImplIcAtIons for polIce lAw
The new position of the ECtHR also has implications for police 
(administrative) law, as this was the issue in the S., V., and A. v. Denmark 
case. The need for preventive arrest may arise more often in police 
operations than in the framework of criminal procedure, which is 
connected with situations such as football hooliganism, riots, or terrorism.
According to the S., V., and A. v. Denmark judgment, Article 5 § 
1 c may be a ground not only for preventive arrest in the framework of 
criminal procedure but also in the framework of law regulating police 
operations. Therefore, the Ostendorf requirement of showing disobedience 
with respect to a certain obligation, which was in many cases difficult 
to fulfil, as the risk was often imminent and there was a need for acting, 
not for giving warnings, may be replaced by identification of the risk 
of future crime. Of course, the crime must be identified with adequate 
precision in relation to the type of crime, place, and date. Therefore, 
general internment is not possible.
This may be seem as easing the work of the police, as no prior 
warning, ban, or restriction is required. The police may now arrest the 
person in the first contact if the risk of crime is adequately established.
7. requIrements for preventIve Arrest
An important question is in which circumstances preventive arrest 
is allowed. The Court in S., V., and A. and in other judgments identified 
several requirements that must be observed so that preventive detention 
would not be arbitrary. 
First, for an arrest to be lawful, it must have a legal base in the 
domestic law. Arrest is a serious interference with the right to personal liberty; 
therefore, procedural, and substantive requirements must be regulated in law. 
This requires not only that, formally, there is a legal provision allowing arrest, 
but that the provision must be sufficiently precise, especially concerning 
grounds, time, relevant authorities, and accessibility for the citizens58.
58 Judgment of the ECtHR of 23 September 1998 in case Steel and others v the 
United Kingdom, application n. 24838/94, § 52-54; judgment of the ECtHR of 
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Second, the term “offence”, mentioned in Article 5 § 1 (c), 
must be interpreted strictly. The risk of tort or antisocial behaviour 
not constituting an offence is not enough. However, the term has an 
autonomous meaning in the ECHR59 and does not have to be limited to 
conduct that has been characterised as an offence under national law60. 
The elements of the offence must be sufficiently well defined. As the 
ECtHR indicated in Steel and others61 “given the importance of personal 
liberty, it is essential that the applicable national law meet the standard of 
“lawfulness” set by the Convention, which requires that all law, whether 
written or unwritten, be sufficiently precise to allow the citizen – if need 
be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail”. 
This requirement is particularly important today in terrorism cases, 
where general, vague definitions of offences significantly increase the 
risk of arbitrary arrest62.
Third, according to the Court case law, preventive arrest may be 
applied to prevent a concrete and specific offence63. This requirement is 
connected with the use of the singular form (“offence”) and the general 
requirement that arrest is not arbitrary. The offence must be concrete 
and specific regarding, in particular, the place and time of its commission 
and its victims64. It is not enough to refer to a crime generally or to a 
particular type of crime only. Therefore, general reference to “offences 
of an extremist nature” was not regarded as specific enough to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c).65 Of course, it would be impossible to 
expect such details as the exact number of victims, modus operandi of 
12 January 2010 in case Gillan and Quinton v the United Kingdom, application 
n. 4158/05, § 76–87.
59 Judgment of the ECtHR of 8 June 1976 in case Engel and others v the Nether-
lands, applications n. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72.
60 Steel and others v the United Kingdom,§ 48-49.
61 Steel and others v the United Kingdom, § 54.
62 GALLI Francesca. The Law…, supra, p. 41-90.
63 Judgment of the ECtHR of 21 June 2011 in case Shimovolos v Russia, applica-
tion n. 30194/09, § 53 – 55.
64 Schwabe and M. G. v Germany, § 70.
65 Shimovolos v Russia, §55.
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the perpetrator, description of injuries, or names of participators in the 
crime. It could be observed that in the Danish case, the Court declared 
the offence concrete and specific because, as “the second and third 
applicants and the first applicant respectively had been prevented from 
instigating or continuing to instigate a brawl between football hooligans 
at Amagertorv Square at 3:50 p.m. and in front of Tivoli Gardens at 4:45 
p.m. on the relevant day, the place and time could be very precisely 
described. Likewise, the victims could be identified as the public present 
at those places at the times mentioned”66. 
Fourth, the Court underlined that “the authorities must furnish 
some facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that 
the person concerned would in all likelihood have been involved in the 
concrete and specific offence had its commission not been prevented by 
the detention”67. As was underlined in Kurt v. Austria68 “a risk must be 
real and immediate in order to trigger a State’s positive obligation under 
Article 2 to take preventive operational measures for life protection”. 
In the same judgment, it was indicated that “the scope of the positive 
obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. The Court is 
fully conscious of the difficulties encountered by the domestic authorities 
when deciding, as in the instant case, whether or not to issue a barring 
order against a suspect or even arrest him or her, on the basis of limited 
information available, often under time pressure and by nonetheless 
carefully balancing the rights of the person who poses a threat on the 
one hand, and the rights of the victim(s) on the other. It is therefore 
most relevant to recapitulate what was known to the authorities at the 
time when they decided which measures to take in respect of E., taking 
into account the competencies accorded to them by the law and a certain 
discretion offered by this law”.69 In recent judgments, the ECtHR also 
made a distinction between cases concerning protection of identified 
66 S., V., and A. v. Denmark, § 158.
67 S., V., and A. v. Denmark, § 127.
68 Judgment of the ECtHR of 4 July 2019 in case Kurt v. Austria, application n. 
62903/15, § 72.
69 Kurt v. Austria, § 69.
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individuals (e.g. victims in pending proceedings) and cases where 
general protection of society is at stake (e.g. in case of danger emanating 
from a mentally unstable, alcohol addicted person with a history of 
violence)70. In the second type of cases, the risk also could be real and 
imminent71. In the commentary to the judgment in S. V., and A.72 it is 
argued that the Court allowed the arrest of individuals “for offences 
they may commit in the near future, rather than offences that were, in 
practice, imminent”. In the case of domestic violence, special diligence 
is required, which means that the authorities are obliged to carry out 
a due lethal risk assessment and assess the risk, taking due account of 
the particular context of domestic violence73. The risk assessment must 
refer directly to the person arrested, not to the organisation to which 
he or she belongs74.
Fifth, the decision authorising preventive detention must give 
all the reasons for detention, present the facts established, refer to legal 
provisions, and explain why the detention is necessary75. This means 
that the reasons must have adequate informative value. This is not 
the case when the “reasons given were extremely laconic and did not 
refer to any legal provision which would have permitted the applicant’s 
detention”76. This requirement may be difficult to observe in terrorist 
cases, as state authorities are usually reluctant to reveal evidence 
and sources of information that may impede ongoing operations or 
investigations. The ECtHR accepts that “Certainly Article 5 § 1 (c) (art. 
5-1-c) of the Convention should not be applied in such a manner as to 
70 See the judgment of ECtHR of 17 December 2020 in case Kotilainen v Finland, 
application n. 62439/12, § 65 – 73 and the judgments quoted.
71 Judgment of ECtHR of 18 September 2014 in case Bljakaj and others v Croatia, 
application n. 74448/12, § 120 - 121.
72 STEINBRECHER Marie, WADHAM John. S, V and A against Denmark: Grand 
Chamber authorises preventive detention, European Human Rights Law Re-
view, n. 1, 2019, p. 88.
73 Judgment of the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) of 15 June 2021 in case Kurt v 
Austria, application n. 62903/15, § 166 – 176.
74 Judgment of the ECtHR of 6 April 2000 in case Labita v Italy, application n. 
26772/95, § 162 – 163.
75 S., V., and A. v. Denmark, § 92.
76 S., V., and A. v. Denmark, § 92.
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put disproportionate difficulties in the way of the police authorities 
of the Contracting States in taking effective measures to counter 
organised terrorism (…) It follows that the Contracting States cannot 
be asked to establish the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the 
arrest of a suspected terrorist by disclosing the confidential sources 
of supporting information or even facts which would be susceptible 
of indicating such sources or their identity”, but at the same time 
underlines that “the Court must be enabled to ascertain whether the 
essence of the safeguard afforded by Article 5 § 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) has 
been secured. Consequently the respondent Government have to 
furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the 
Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having 
committed the alleged offence”77.
Sixth, arrest and detention must be “reasonably considered 
necessary” in the circumstances of the case. This is a reference to the 
proportionality principle. In the context of that requirement, in the 
Court’s view “less severe measures have to be considered and found to 
be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which might 
require that the person concerned be detained. Preventive detention 
cannot reasonably be considered necessary unless a proper balance is 
struck between the importance in a democratic society of preventing 
an imminent risk of an offence being committed and the importance 
of the right to liberty. In order to be proportionate to such a serious 
measure as deprivation of liberty, the concrete and specific “offence” 
referred to under the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (c) must also be of a 
serious nature, entailing danger to life and limb or significant material 
damage”.78 Therefore a risk of theft, fraud or similar non-violent crime 
will generally not justify preventive deprivation of liberty. It follows in 
addition that the detention should cease as soon as the risk has passed, 
which requires monitoring, the duration of the detention being also a 
77 Judgment of the ECtHR of 30 August 1990 in case Campbell and Hartley v 
the United Kingdom, applications n. 12244/86, 12245/86 and 12383/86, § 
34. See also judgment of the ECtHR of 16 October 2001 in case O’Hara v the 
United Kingdom, application n. 37555/97, § 34–37.
78 S., V., and A. v. Denmark, § 161.
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relevant factor”79. In some situations, measures such as confiscation of 
objects or police supervision may be sufficient80. Fulfilment of positive 
obligations cannot lead to breach of Article 5 of ECHR81. Further, there 
must be consideration for the extent to which the measures affect 
interests protected by rights other than the right to personal freedom 
guaranteed by the Convention (for example, freedom of assembly or 
freedom of expression)82.
Seventh, the detainee shall be brought promptly before a judge 
to have the lawfulness of his or her detention reviewed, or to be released 
before such time (Article 5 § 3). In the case of a short-time arrest, the 
person concerned is usually not brought before a judge while still arrested, 
but after release, he or she may challenge the decision or procedure 
of arrest. Finding a breach of relevant regulations by a judge in such a 
situation may give not only satisfaction and kind of rehabilitation but 
also a ground for claiming damages. In the Court’s opinion “release <<at 
a time before prompt judicial control>> in the context of preventive 
detention should be a matter of hours rather than days”83. It must also 
be underlined that release before judicial control does not remove the 
question of the lawfulness of detention, as the right to judicial review 
must be real and effective84. Therefore, the person is still entitled to have 
a judicial review of the detention.
Eighth, in the case of failure to comply with the requirements, 
the person concerned should have an enforceable right to compensation 
in accordance with Article 5 § 5 of the ECHR85. 
These requirements are common in criminal procedure and 
police law. In the case of preventive arrest within criminal procedure, 
presumption of innocence and rights of defence must also be observed, 
79 S., V., and A. v. Denmark, § 161.
80 Schwabe and M. G. v. Germany, § 75.
81 Schwabe and M. G. v. Germany, § 85.
82 Schwabe and M. G. v. Germany, § 119.
83 S. V., and A. v Denmark, § 134.
84 See judgment of the ECtHR of 8 April 2010 in case Peša v Croatia, application 
n. 40523/08, § 110 – 126.
85 Schwabe and M. G. v Germany, § 136.
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and the arrest shall not prejudice the case against the person arrested, for 
example, by suggesting to the trier the fact that he is so dangerous that 
he must be sent to prison even if the evidence of his guilt raises doubts. 
The three legal systems presented above clearly reveal 
compliance with the first requirement: regulation in domestic law. 
The second requirement is more problematic, as the Polish and Danish 
regulations in police law refer to danger, not to offence. Therefore in 
order to comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c), the notion 
of danger requires narrow interpretation, limited to danger of offence. 
In the third requirement, the offence being concrete and specific is not 
directly listed in the regulations presented; therefore, the interpretation 
of danger of offence must be further limited to situations when the 
potential offence could be described precisely enough. Regarding the 
fourth requirement, it is required directly or indirectly in all regulations. 
Informing the person arrested about the grounds of arrest is required 
in the laws of the three states, although the issue of due justification is 
largely a matter of practice. The sixth requirement (proportionality) is 
the most problematic. It is certainly fulfilled in the Polish CCP, narrowing 
the preventive arrest to domestic violence. In Danish police law, it is 
limited to the danger of disturbing public order or danger to individuals 
or public order, and the subsidiarity clause is included. In Polish police 
law, there is reference to danger to life, health or property. The third 
type of danger might not fulfil the proportionality principle because 
the right to personal freedom is generally of higher value than property 
rights. The Danish criminal procedure refers to offences subject to 
public prosecution, which is very wide but forbids disproportionate 
arrests (Article 755 (4) of the Danish Administration of Justice Act). 
The English regulation refers to offences generally, but this is limited 
by Article 24 (5) (c) and (d) of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, which refers to physical injury, loss or damage to property, 
public decency, unlawful obstruction of the highway and protection of a 
child or vulnerable person. The most problematic in the context of the 
proportionality principle seems to be the protection of property and 
public decency. All three systems provide judicial control (the seventh 
requirement). Nothing in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR suggests that 
the systems generally do not provide an effective right to compensation.
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8. conclusIons
The new approach of the ECtHR may have significant 
consequences for the development of preventive justice in Europe. 
The Court has recognised new threats to public security and extended 
the possibility of preventive arrest. Therefore, we can conclude that 
an arrest for preventive purposes can now be applied more easily. One 
may wonder whether that change in the Convention standards will 
not force the Court to further reassess its position in the near future. 
Important social problems and threats (e.g. domestic violence, terrorism, 
criminal cases related to the COVID-19 pandemic) and the development 
of the concept of positive obligations of states give a good occasion for 
that. An important aspect is the development of the concept of special 
diligence in relation to some risks. In Kotilainen,86 the ECtHR accepted 
that the crime committed was not reasonably foreseeable, so there was 
no real and immediate risk to life directed at identifiable individuals 
whom the authorities knew or ought to have known at the relevant 
time. However, the Court found a breach of Article 2, indicating that in 
situations involving a high level of risk (such as misuse of firearms), there 
is a special duty of diligence on the authorities, requiring their action 
without any high threshold for the application of preventive measures. 
This approach was also taken by the Grand Chamber in Kurt v. Austria 
in the context of domestic violence. In the future, this may result in 
lowering the threshold for intervention in this type of cases. Further, the 
requirement of due risk analysis may lead to the development and wider 
use of risk assessment tools and procedures. Another scenario is that 
the wide opening of the possibility to use preventive detention in S. V., 
and A. v. Denmark will lead to such overuse of preventive measures by 
the parties of ECHR that the Court will be forced to restrict its position, 
for example by strict interpretation of the terms “concrete and specific 
offence” or “real and immediate risk”.
In the light of S. V., and A., preventive arrest may now be regulated 
more widely in the framework of criminal procedure, which may increase 
86 Kotilainen and others v Denmark, § 74 – 90.
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the protection of the persons arrested and avoid the duplication of regimes 
of deprivation of liberty. 
For now, a twofold regulation of preventive arrest could be 
proposed in countries that distinguish police law and criminal procedure:
a) Preventive arrest applied in cases where there is an imminent 
risk of serious crime without suspicion of an already-
committed crime. This should be regulated in police law. 
If suspicion of crime is established after the arrest, the 
regulations of criminal procedure be applied, which usually 
provides more guarantees, replacing police law instruments.
b) Preventive arrest applied when there is suspicion that a 
certain crime has already been committed and there is 
an imminent risk of other serious crimes. This should be 
regulated in criminal procedure. The preventive ground for 
arrest may be applied with other procedural grounds (e.g. 
risk of absconding, collusion) or as a sole ground.
Considering the significance of personal freedom in a democratic 
society and the serious interference of preventive detention with freedom 
in both frameworks, the requirements of preventive arrest indicated 
above must be observed. 
Finally, the analysis of the European standards and their 
comparison with the regulations in the three legal systems presented 
leads to the conclusion that the implementation of the standards could also 
be a matter of legal interpretation of existing regulations and practices, 
not necessarily changes in the law. However, precise regulations in the 
area decrease the possibility of overuse of preventive arrest by arbitrary 
decisions, and therefore should be strongly recommended. If the grounds 
for detention are general and vague, allowing for a wide interpretation, 
they might not comply with the requirements of Article 5 of the ECHR 
and may lead to a breach of the article. The analysis and comparison also 
show that the regulation of preventive arrest in domestic law in compliance 
with the Convention standards may take many forms.
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